108 lines
6.1 KiB
ReStructuredText
108 lines
6.1 KiB
ReStructuredText
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=========
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SafeSetID
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=========
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SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict
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UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
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system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs
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from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as
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allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings.
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Background
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==========
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In absence of file capabilities, processes spawned on a Linux system that need
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to switch to a different user must be spawned with CAP_SETUID privileges.
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CAP_SETUID is granted to programs running as root or those running as a non-root
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user that have been explicitly given the CAP_SETUID runtime capability. It is
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often preferable to use Linux runtime capabilities rather than file
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capabilities, since using file capabilities to run a program with elevated
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privileges opens up possible security holes since any user with access to the
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file can exec() that program to gain the elevated privileges.
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While it is possible to implement a tree of processes by giving full
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CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities, this is often at odds with the goals of running a
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tree of processes under non-root user(s) in the first place. Specifically,
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since CAP_SETUID allows changing to any user on the system, including the root
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user, it is an overpowered capability for what is needed in this scenario,
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especially since programs often only call setuid() to drop privileges to a
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lesser-privileged user -- not elevate privileges. Unfortunately, there is no
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generally feasible way in Linux to restrict the potential UIDs that a user can
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switch to through setuid() beyond allowing a switch to any user on the system.
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This SafeSetID LSM seeks to provide a solution for restricting setid
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capabilities in such a way.
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The main use case for this LSM is to allow a non-root program to transition to
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other untrusted uids without full blown CAP_SETUID capabilities. The non-root
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program would still need CAP_SETUID to do any kind of transition, but the
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additional restrictions imposed by this LSM would mean it is a "safer" version
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of CAP_SETUID since the non-root program cannot take advantage of CAP_SETUID to
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do any unapproved actions (e.g. setuid to uid 0 or create/enter new user
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namespace). The higher level goal is to allow for uid-based sandboxing of system
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services without having to give out CAP_SETUID all over the place just so that
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non-root programs can drop to even-lesser-privileged uids. This is especially
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relevant when one non-root daemon on the system should be allowed to spawn other
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processes as different uids, but its undesirable to give the daemon a
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basically-root-equivalent CAP_SETUID.
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Other Approaches Considered
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===========================
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Solve this problem in userspace
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-------------------------------
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For candidate applications that would like to have restricted setid capabilities
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as implemented in this LSM, an alternative option would be to simply take away
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setid capabilities from the application completely and refactor the process
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spawning semantics in the application (e.g. by using a privileged helper program
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to do process spawning and UID/GID transitions). Unfortunately, there are a
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number of semantics around process spawning that would be affected by this, such
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as fork() calls where the program doesn???t immediately call exec() after the
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fork(), parent processes specifying custom environment variables or command line
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args for spawned child processes, or inheritance of file handles across a
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fork()/exec(). Because of this, as solution that uses a privileged helper in
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userspace would likely be less appealing to incorporate into existing projects
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that rely on certain process-spawning semantics in Linux.
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Use user namespaces
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-------------------
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Another possible approach would be to run a given process tree in its own user
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namespace and give programs in the tree setid capabilities. In this way,
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programs in the tree could change to any desired UID/GID in the context of their
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own user namespace, and only approved UIDs/GIDs could be mapped back to the
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initial system user namespace, affectively preventing privilege escalation.
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Unfortunately, it is not generally feasible to use user namespaces in isolation,
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without pairing them with other namespace types, which is not always an option.
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Linux checks for capabilities based off of the user namespace that ???owns??? some
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entity. For example, Linux has the notion that network namespaces are owned by
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the user namespace in which they were created. A consequence of this is that
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capability checks for access to a given network namespace are done by checking
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whether a task has the given capability in the context of the user namespace
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that owns the network namespace -- not necessarily the user namespace under
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which the given task runs. Therefore spawning a process in a new user namespace
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effectively prevents it from accessing the network namespace owned by the
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initial namespace. This is a deal-breaker for any application that expects to
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retain the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for the purpose of adjusting network
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configurations. Using user namespaces in isolation causes problems regarding
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other system interactions, including use of pid namespaces and device creation.
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Use an existing LSM
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-------------------
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None of the other in-tree LSMs have the capability to gate setid transitions, or
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even employ the security_task_fix_setuid hook at all. SELinux says of that hook:
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"Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux controls
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are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
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this operation."
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Directions for use
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==================
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This LSM hooks the setid syscalls to make sure transitions are allowed if an
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applicable restriction policy is in place. Policies are configured through
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securityfs by writing to the safesetid/add_whitelist_policy and
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safesetid/flush_whitelist_policies files at the location where securityfs is
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mounted. The format for adding a policy is '<UID>:<UID>', using literal
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numbers, such as '123:456'. To flush the policies, any write to the file is
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sufficient. Again, configuring a policy for a UID will prevent that UID from
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obtaining auxiliary setid privileges, such as allowing a user to set up user
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namespace UID mappings.
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